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Abstract—Quantitative characterization of randomly roving
agents in Agent Based Intrusion Detection Environment (ABIDE)
is studied. Formula simplifications regarding known results
and publications are given. Extended Agent Based Intrusion
Detection Environment (EABIDE) is introduced and quantitative
characterization of roving agents in EABIDE is studies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks (WSN) are composed of thou-
sands of nodes that are spatially distributed in an unattended
area usually without prior knowledge of the network topology.
They act as a real time environmental monitoring tool by
sensing and reporting environmental data to the base station,
which usually happens in a multi-hop way. In many WSN
applications, like hostile area monitoring or when WSN acts
as an intrusion detection system for a building, the security
of the network is crucial. Especially when network nodes
are deployed in an unattended area an adversary can have
a physical access to them which will allow him to read,
modify or erase the content of a node. In some deployments
node replication attack also becomes feasible. The aim of an
intrusion detection system (IDS) for those networks is to act as
the second defence line against network attacks that preventive
mechanisms fail to address [6]. An Intrusion detection system
for a network is a system that dynamically monitors the events
taking place on a network and decides whether these events
are symptoms of an attack or constitute a legitimate use of
the system [7]. Comprehensive surveys on IDS for WSN are
presented in [1], [12].
Agent based intrusion detection systems became popular
because of their scalability, reconfigurability and survivability
[2], [5], [15], [8], [3]. It is more difficult for an attacker to
deal with such IDS as they do not have defined structures
and are not predictable. In this work we discuss an agent
based intrusion detection system called ABIDE (Agent Based
Intrusion Detection Environment) [14], [13], [11] which uses
autonomous software agents for intrusion detection in com-
puter networks. In ABIDE autonomous agents are moving
randomly in a network along communication links and record-
ing/calculating a unique information on randomly selected
nodes. An example of such unique information can be a check-
sum of the operating system running on a node, which can
help to understand whether it has been modified or not. Later
each agent passes the data it collected to a special agent which
combines the data received from various agents and tries to
determine weather an intrusion took place or not (more details
on ABIDE are given in Section II). [11] tries to calculate the
number of agents required by ABIDE for detecting intrusions
in a given size network with a given probability. The formulas,
that give the relation between the number of agents and the
probability of an intrusion to be detected, presented in [11],
such as Formula (1), are complex and unobservable and their
simplifications or approximations are of interest. By this same
reason [11] considers a computer simulation instead of using
the Formula (1), to understand the typical number of agents
necessary to retrieve the required information in a network.
Our work tends to prove simple formulas analytically, for
the same numerical characteristics of ABIDE, which can be
used to understand the relations between the number of agents
and the amount of information that can be gathered by them,
without considering a software simulations. We also propose
the extended version of ABIDE, called EABIDE and consider
the same quantitative characteristics for it. As a result we
get formulas representing the relation between the number of
roving agents in EABIDE and the amount of information that
can be gathered by them in terms of Stirling numbers of the
second kind. Known asymptotic estimates for Stirling numbers
of second kind can further be applied to get more compact
approximations [4], [9], [16].
II. AGENT BASED INTRUSION DETECTION ENVIRONMENT
(ABIDE)
Consider a network where each node has a software agent
hosting environment (i.e. software agents can move into a
node perform some action and leave.). ABIDE [11] uses four
different kinds of agents to organize intrusion detection and
correction in the system.
1) A Data Mining Agent (DMA) roams around in a net-
work (i.e. randomly chooses a host node and moves
there) and acquires environmental information from
nodes. DMA is lightweight and uses simplest mining al-
gorithms. For example DMA may calculate a checksum
of the operating system that runs on a host node, and if
it decides that the value of the checksum is suspicious
it can keep the value and curry on for further analysis.
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2) A Data Fusion Agent (DFA) roams around or is located
on the base station. It receives the data collected by
various DMAs and builds a larger picture of events
from this data. As the DFA has a combined data it
can apply classical intrusion detection techniques to
determine whether an intrusion took place or not. Of
course the power of the DFA depends on the quantity
of information received from DMAs.
3) Nodes that have been identified as suspicious by DFA
are further visited by a Probe Agent (PA), sent by DFA,
which performs a test on a host node to confirm the
intrusion.
4) Once the intrusion is confirmed by a PA a Corrective
Agent (CA) can be dispatched by a DFA to take actions.
We tend to answer to the following question. What is the
probability of identifying intrusions in a network of a given
size with the set of given DMAs in a presence of a single
DFA, where DFA needs information from at least t distinct
nodes [11] in order to be able to determine whether there is
an intrusion or not. Further this can be used to calculate the
number of DMAs required for identifying intrusions in a given
network with a given probability.
Formally the problem we consider is the following. Given
a set of k DMAs which roam around in a network of n nodes.
Each DMA has a storage where it can keep a data from m
different nodes. DMA returns to DFA as soon as it acquires
a data from exactly m randomly chosen distinct nodes. Note
that when a DMA moves into a node it is not obliged to
take actions there, the node can be used as intermediate
hop for roaming, this way randomness of the visited nodes
(nodes where a data has been collected) can be guaranteed.
It is required to calculate the probability Pk(n,m, t) of DFA
having data from exactly t distinct nodes. Note that each DMA
gathers a data from m distinct nodes but the data gathered by
two different DMA may intersect. [11] provides the following
formula
Pk(n,m, t) =(
n
m
)−(k−1) m∑
m2,m3,...,mk−1=0
(
m
m2
)(
n−m
m−m2
)
·
·
(
2m−m2
m3
)(
n− 2m+m2
m−m3
)
. . .
. . .
(
(k − 2)m−m2 − . . .−mk−2
mk−1
)
·
·
(
n− (k − 2)m+m2 + . . .+mk−2
m−mk−1
)
·
·
(
(k − 1)m−m2 − . . .−mk−1
km− t−m2 − . . .−mk−1
)
·
·
(
n− (k − 1)m+m2 + . . .+mk−1
t− (k − 1)m+m2 + . . .+mk−1
)
, k ≥ 4. (1)
Of course (1) is unobservable and simplifications or ap-
proximations are of interest. By this same reason (1) con-
siders computer simulations for approximating the value of
Fig. 1. Matrix representation of visited nodes.
Pk(n,m, t). Below we present formula simplifications that
allow to compute the exact value of Pk(n,m, t) without
software simulations.
III. COVERAGE CHARACTERIZATION OF ROVING AGENTS
IN ABIDE
Consider a set N = {v1, ..., vn} of n nodes and subsets
Si ⊂ N, i = 1, ..., k, where subset Si corresponds to the set of
nodes visited by agent 1 i and is of size m (here we say a node
is visited by agent i if i collected a date from that node, i.e.
nodes that were used as intermediate hops for roaming are not
considered as visited). We consider a probability distribution
scheme over N . As the nodes visited by agents are random the
subsets Si, i = 1, ...k will be independent and equiprobable.
Having in total Cmn subsets of size m the probability for one
of them to acquire is 1/Cmn . We are interested in probabilistic
characteristics of union ∪ki=1Si and its size. In particular, what
is the probability that the union of those subsets contains
exactly t elements.
Pk(n,m, t) = Pr
(∣∣∣∣∣
k⋃
i=1
Si
∣∣∣∣∣ = t
)
. (2)
Consider a matrix Ak×n = {aij} (Figure 1) where
aij =
{
1 if vj ∈ Si
0 otherwise
. (3)
From |Si| = m it follows that each row of matrix A will be
composed of exactly m 1s and n−m 0s. A column j of matrix
A represents the node vj and it composed of zeros alone, if
and only if non of the k agents visited the node vj , i.e. non of
the subsets Si contains vj . Therefore the union ∪ki=1Si will
be composed of exactly t distinct elements if and only if A
contains exactly n− t columns composed of 0s alone and all
the other columns contain at least one 1. It is obvious that
the number of possibilities to get information from exactly
t out of n nodes, with k agents equipped with a memory
of size m is given by the number of A matrices discussed
above. Denote the number of k × t sub-matrices Q (Figure
2) that have exactly m 1 on each row and have at least one
1 on each column by Q(k,m, t). Then the number of k × n
1later in paper by saying agent we mean DMA
Fig. 2. Sub-matrix Q.
matrices with exactly m ones on each row and with exactly
n− t columns with no 1s will be
Ctn ·Q(k,m, t) (4)
where Ctn stands for the number of possibilities to pick t out
of n nodes (columns) and Q(k,m, t) stands for the number
of possibilities to cover all the t nodes by k agents equipped
with a memory of size m.
Q(k,m, t) can be calculated by inclusion-exclusion princi-
ple. First, over k × t matrices we take all the matrices with
exactly m 1s on each row, then we remove all the matrices
that have at least one column initially filled in with 0s (such
matrices do not obey the conditions we require), then we add
matrices with at least 2 columns filled in with 0s and so on.
The formula representation of related quantities is
Q(k,m, t) =
(Cmt )
k − C1t ·
(
Cmt−1
)k
+ C2t ·
(
Cmt−2
)k − . . .
+ (−1)t−m Ct−mt · (Cmm )k =
t−m∑
i=0
(−1)i Cit ·
(
Cmt−i
)k
(5)
We have proven
Theorem 1.
Pk(n,m, t) =
Ctn ·Q(k,m, t)
(Cmn )
k
=
=
Ctn ·
∑t−m
i=0 (−1)i Cit ·
(
Cmt−i
)k
(Cmn )
k
. (6)
Proof: The proof follows from (4), (5) and the fact that
the number of k× n matrices with exactly m 1s on each row
is (Cmn )
k.
First of all here we receive a real simplification of (1). The
formula received is still complex, but it might be easily calcu-
lated and the applied Markov inequality may give asymptotic
estimates of t-subset probabilities [10].
Another important characteristic, the mean value of subset
size t, might be computed as:
min(km,n)∑
t=m
t · Pk(n,m, t) =
=
min(km,n)∑
t=m
t · Ctn ·
∑t−m
i=0 (−1)i Cit ·
(
Cmt−i
)k
(Cmn )
k
. (7)
IV. EXTENDED AGENT BASED INTRUSION DETECTION
ENVIRONMENT (EABIDE)
We generalize the intrusion detection system proposed in
[11] by allowing data mining agents (DMA) to collect a
redundant data, i.e. in contrast with the original version of
ABIDE, where each DMA collects data from m randomly
chosen distinct nodes, here DMA is allowed to have more
than one instance of the same data in his memory (i.e. on each
visit of the same node data might be calculated and stored).
DMA do not store several copies of the same data in purpose,
this can be unavoidable in networks where network nodes are
indistinguishable from DMA point of view. The later might be
required by the security system of the network (e.g. if nodes
use randomized and encrypted IDs DMA can not recognize
the node visited before as it will have different ID, so the data
collected from the same node during two different visits will
be indistinguishable). As a result when the memory of a DMA
is full it will contain data from 1 ≤ l ≤ m distinct nodes in
contrast with m in case of ABIDE. A data fusion agent (DFA),
having access to security schemes deployed in the networks,
can sort out the data received from a DMA, discard redundant
data and keep the l pieces of distinct data.
In Extended Agent Based Intrusion Detection Environment
(EABIDE) we are interested in the same question as before.
What is the probability of identifying intrusions in a
network of a given size with the set of given DMAs
in a presence of a single DFA, where DFA needs
information from at least t distinct nodes in order to
be able to determine whether there is an intrusion
or not. Further this can be used to calculate the
number of DMAs required for identifying intrusions
in a given network with a given probability.
Formally the problem we consider is the following. Given
a set of k DMAs which roam around in a network of n nodes.
Each DMA has a storage where it can keep m pieces of data.
DMA returns to DFA as soon as it acquires m pieces of data,
from randomly chosen nodes (from DMA point of view all the
m pieces of data will be different). Note that when a DMA
moves into a node it is not obliged to take actions there, the
node can be used as intermediate hop for roaming, this way
randomness of the visited nodes (nodes where a data has been
collected) can be guaranteed. It is required to calculate the
probability P ∗k (n,m, t) of DFA having data from exactly t
distinct nodes. The difference with the ABIDE is that not only
the data gathered by different DMA may intersect but also the
data in the memory of a single DMA may be redundant.
V. COVERAGE CHARACTERIZATION OF ROVING AGENTS
IN EABIDE
Consider a set N = {v1, ..., vn} of n nodes and subsets
S∗i ⊂ N, i = 1, ..., k, where subset S∗i corresponds to the set
of distinct nodes visited by agent i (after removing repeating
nodes, i.e. a set of nodes by DFA point of view) and 1 ≤
|S∗i | ≤ m (here we say a node is visited by agent i if i
collected a date from that node, i.e. nodes that were used as
intermediate hops for roaming are not considered as visited).
We consider a probability distribution scheme over N . We are
interested in probabilistic characteristics of union ∪ki=1S∗i and
its size. In particular, what is the probability that the union of
those subsets contains exactly t elements.
P ∗k (n,m, t) = Pr
(∣∣∣∣∣
k⋃
i=1
S∗i
∣∣∣∣∣ = t
)
. (8)
This time the matrix Bk×n = {bij} corresponding to
subsets S∗i will be
bij =
{
1 if vj ∈ Si
0 otherwise
. (9)
From 1 ≤ |S∗i | ≤ m it follows that on each row of
matrix B there is at least 1 and at most m 1s and the
rest is filled by zeros. A column j of matrix B represents
the node vj and it composed of zeros alone, if and only
if non of the k agents visited the node vj , i.e. non of the
subsets S∗i contains vj . Therefore the union ∪ki=1S∗i will be
composed of exactly t distinct elements if and only if B
contains exactly n − t columns composed by 0s alone and
all the other columns contain at least one 1. It is obvious that
the number of possibilities to get information from exactly
t nodes, of network of n nodes, with k agents that fetch
1 ≤ li ≤ m unique data each is given by the number of
B matrices discussed above. Denote the number of k × t sub-
matrices R, that have 1 ≤ li ≤ m ones on the i-th row (for
all the possible li) and have at least one 1 on each column,
by R(k,m, t). Then the number of B matrices will be
Ctn ·R(k,m, t) (10)
where Ctn stands for the number of possibilities to pick t out
of n nodes (columns) and R(k,m, t) stands for the number
of possibilities to cover all the t nodes by k agents.
For calculating the number of B matrices first we prove
the following lemma which shows the similarities between
schemes ABIDE and EABIDE.
Lemma 1. The probability of covering exactly t out of n nodes
with one agent having memory of m units in EABIDE scheme
is equal to the probability of covering exactly t out of n nodes
with m agents having memory of 1 unit in ABIDE scheme.
P ∗1 (n,m, t) = Pm(n, 1, t)
Proof: The proof is simple. Having in mind that at any
point of time each node has the same probability to be visited
by an agent in EABIDE scheme (even those nodes that have
already been visited), each cell of the agent’s memory can be
considered as an individual agent having a memory of size 1
which leads to m agents with one unit of memory in ABIDE
scheme.
Corollary 1. P ∗k (n,m, t) = Pkm(n, 1, t)
Proof: The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 1.
Theorem 2.
R(k,m, t) = Q(km, 1, t) =
t−1∑
i=0
(−1)iCit · (t− i)mk (11)
Proof: The proof follows from Theorem 1 and Corollary
1.
Corollary 2.
P ∗k (n,m, t) =
Ctn ·
∑t−1
i=0(−1)iCit · (t− i)mk
nmk
=
Ctn ·R(k,m, t)
nmk
(12)
Proof: The proof follows from Theorem 2 and Corollary
1.
Finally, we note that R(k,m, t) has equivalent presentation
in terms of Stirling numbers of the second kind [4]
S(N,K) =
1
K!
K∑
j=0
(−1)jCjK(K − j)N . (13)
Formally in the formula of R(k,m, t) we may add the zero
term for i = t, and then we receive
R(k,m, t) = t!S(mk, t) (14)
Stirling number of the second kind S(N,K) is the number
of ways to partition a set of N objects into K non-empty sub-
sets. Existing asymptotic estimates for them [4], [9], [16] allow
to get simple approximations for R(k,m, t) and therefore for
P ∗k (n,m, t).
The following theorem, which is the final postulation of this
paper, can be formulated.
Theorem 3.
P ∗k (n,m, t) =
Ctn · t!S(mk, t)
nkm
(15)
VI. CONCLUSION
In its current state the intrusion detection system called
ABIDE [11] considers software simulations to understand the
number of data mining agents required for identifying intru-
sions in a system with a given probability. In the current paper
we gave formulas that allow to compute this number analyti-
cally. Further we considered the extended version of ABIDE
(EABIDE) and proved formulas for the same quantitative
characteristics. Formulas for EABIDE are achieved in terms of
Stirling numbers of the second kind [4], [9], [16], which allows
to obtain asymptotic estimates and further simplifications for
quantitative characteristics of EABIDE. In the future it will
be interesting to consider the same quantitative characteristics
analytically for more general cases of ABIDE and EABIDE
schemes with more than one DFA.
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